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1Not reported here are the computerized business games utilized in class as well as the formal
experiments involving multistage play of either computer games or matrix games.
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Some Simple Games for Teaching and Research
Part 1:  Cooperative Games
Martin Shubik
Abstract
Over many years some simple cooperative games have been considered in lectures on game
theory.  The games were selected in order to provide insight into various normative theories
of solution to n-person games.  It is suggested that the results indicate that when solutions
have outcomes in common, predictability is higher than when they are apart.  The core is
attractive but less so when it is heavily nonsymmetric.
Introduction
From 1961 to 1994 in teaching game theory I have employed a series of different simple
games in class or in other lectures to illustrate various points and to heighten student
participation1.  For the most part, the students were not paid and played only once in class.
Most of the use of the games was in classes at Yale where the students, for the most part,
were undergraduates (seniors) or Master’s degree students.  Some games were run elsewhere
in the United States, in Austria, Australia, Canada, Chile, India and Hong Kong.
Some of the results reported here have been reported elsewhere (Shubik, 1975, 1978,
1986).  Many games were used over a semester to illustrate different problems in the game
theoretic treatment of cooperative and competitive behavior.  In this part the remarks are
confined to some cooperative games.
Game Theory, Learning and Psychology
There are many different purposes for which simple experiments can be utilized and many
different controls which can be imposed.  There is no single satisfactory solution to all -
person games.  There are many solutions which have been suggested and depending upon
both the questions being asked and the context specified, formal game theory has been of
considerable use in illuminating various aspects of multi person decision making.
The control of experiments with human decision makers poses many difficult problems.
In particular the gap between game theory solutions and what we see when running
experiments or eliciting opinions may be attributed to several key factors.  In particular
intrinsic in much of game theory is the concept of external symmetry.  This is the
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assumption that all individuals are equally talented and differ only by the rules specified in
the game.  Thus, for example, any two individuals are assumed to have the same memory
and enculturation unless otherwise specified in the game specification.  The psychologists
and social psychologists, in contrast concentrate on individual and cultural differences.
Another basic source of experimental difficulty is the description of individual preferences,
utility functions and payoffs.  For the most part the numbers in the payoff functions are
either linked to small sums of money or are otherwise merely symbolic abstract numbers to
be maximized.
All game experiments contrast with the game theoretic idealizations of intelligent
externally symmetric individuals with well defined preferences and payoff  functions, each
approaching a new game with a tabula rasa.  Another distinction of considerable importance
in gaming is whether or not the individuals play anonymously or whether they play face-to-
face.  Yet another distinction, of considerable importance is whether the decision-maker is
playing to his or her own account or is a fiduciary.  In much of actual economic, political
and societal decision making, the decision maker is a fiduciary playing with other people’s
money, rights or lives.
Not only are there problems in measuring individual preferences and utility functions
there are many questions to be raised about whether or not individuals make interpersonal
comparisons of welfare and whether they are in a position to transfer “utility” in an approx-
imately linear manner.  Much of the original von Neumann and Morgenstern development
of cooperative theory was based on the considerable simplification that utility was
measurable, interpersonally comparable and linearly transferable.  
Another difficulty encountered in both socio-psychological and economic experimen-
tation with games is the size of the matrix utilized.  Most experimentation has been confined
to 2 × 2 matrix games because of memory, calculation and perception problems (se  Miller’s
classical article, 1956); although if there is considerable regularity in the structure of the
matrix larger games have been used, as for example, Fouraker, Shubik and Siegel (1963)
utilized matrices around 20 × 20 for duopoly games.
Three major divisions in game theoretic analysis and in gaming experimentation have
been the representation of games in (1) coalitional form; (2) strategic form and (3) extensive
form.  The first is used extensively in the study of cooperative solution theories and these
theories may be considered as primarily normative.  The various axiomatizations of the dif-
ferent solution concepts represent different sets of desiderata suggested for an outcome to
be considered as a solution.
The stategic form has probably been by far the most popular of the experimental game
structures used.  It frequently comes in two variations.  They are a matrix game (usually a
2 ×2 matrix game) representing a two player game where each agent has a choice between
two moves and each player plays once, or a matrix game which is played repeatedly for a
fixed or random number of times.  In most multistage game experiments the form of pre-
sentation is a matrix game which is then played more than once.
There is evidence that the display of the game influences the way individuals play.  For
example instead of presenting individuals with a 2 × 2 matrix game to play twice, giving all
the results of the first play prior to their second play, one could give all players a
strategically equivalent 8 × 8 matrix to be played once.  Shubik, Wolf and Poon (1974)
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found considerable differences in the way agents played in the two scenarios.
 Although the Prisoner’s Dilemma , Chicken and  The Battle of the Sexes games have
been the most popular experimental vehicles there are 78 strategically distinct 2 × 2 matrix
games with strict orderings and over 700 2 × 2 strategically different games with ties.  In a
heroic work Rapoport, Guyer and Gord n (1976) reported experiments with all 78 matrices.
The third representation of the game, the extensive form presents a detailed description
suited to dynamics.  The extensive form is eminently suited for raising basic questions con-
cerning the concept of threat and the many variations of the basic idea of a noncooperative
equilibrium which reflect both learning and teaching (see Van Damme, 1996, for an
extensive coverage and Harsanyi and Selten, 1986, for criteria for equilibrium selection and
Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986, for a consideration of problems with the extensive form).
The Games And The Motivation For Their Use
The games noted here and in the subsequent parts, were utilized in order to investigate
problems in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory and to consider attitudes
towards risk and interpersonal comparisons of payoffs.  All three major game forms were
used in the game experiments noted.  This report is devoted to three cooperative games
which were investigated in order to explore how the selections of relatively naive agents
relate to the various cooperative solutions which have been proposed.
Cooperative Solutions
Games denoted as 1a, 1b and 6 were devoted to eliciting opinions on how to play three
cooperative games.  The key distinctions among the games are discussed below.
There are many different motivations for running games, with or without monetary
rewards; with or without elaborate scenarios and with or without a precise hypotheses which
may be falsified by some form of logical or statistical test.  The major motivation here was
exploratory.  The basic question was can we gain some insights into the perceptions and
opinions of relatively naive subjects when confronted with more or less one shot strategic
problems with little context and history.  It is in this spirit that the results are reported
without attempt at great generalization.
The three cooperative game solution concepts considered were the core, the value, the
nucleolus as well as the price system (which requires an economic story to locate it if the
core is large) as well as the symmetric or even split point.
We call a division of the payoff which can be achieved by all agents cooperating, an
imputation of the game.  Intuitively, the core is the set of imputations against which no
coalition can propose an alternative which they prefer and could achieve if they acted
independently.  The value of a game gives each individual his a priori expected com-
binatoric marginal value considering the worth of an individual’s entry into all coalitions.
The nucleolus is that imputation for which the difference between what it offers and what
any coalition can achieve is minimized.  The competitive equilibrium is obtained by con-
structing an associated economy which is represented by the game and solving for the
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efficient price system.  The even split point can be regarded as an egalitarian solution which
ignores the influence or  power of subgroups.
Although the prime purpose for utilizing the games was teaching and exploration, I did
have a specific conjecture that a point in the core would be most probably selected when the
core was large; however, with a one point highly nonsymmetric core the frequency of
selection would be considerably attenuated.  It would, however be higher if an economic
scenario were supplied.  I had no clear conjecture for the game (#6) with no core what-
soever.  I wished to use the game as a means for gaining some insight into the choices made.
In all instances I asked the students to provide a verbal description or rationalization of their
choice.
The predominant set of games consisted of plays by nine classes at Yale. There were
also data obtained from seven games in India, seven games in Australia and games in Hong
Kong elsewhere in the United States.
The information on the gain through cooperation was displayed by means of a charac-
teristic function.  The characteristic functions for games 1a, 1b and 6 are shown below.
Game 1a
v(A) = v(B) = v(C) =0
v(AB) =100, v(AC) = 200, v(BC) = 300
v(ABC) =400. 
Game 1b
v(A) = v(B) = v(C) =0
v(AB) =0, v(AC) = 0, v(BC) = 400
v(ABC) =400. 
Game 6
v(A) = v(B) = v(C) =0
v(AB) =250, v(AC) = 300, v(BC) = 350
v(ABC) =400. 
Where A, B and C are the names of the players and v(AC) indicates the amount that players
A and C can obtain by collaborating. 
Game 1a (with a “fat core” and 1b (with a single point core) are illustrated below:
Figure 1 shows the core and various other solution points for game 1a drawn on a
simplex.  The core consists of all imputations in the trapezoidal area denoted by ACDE.
The value, in this instance lies in the .core at point V and the nucleolus is the centroid of the
core denoted by N.
Figure 2 shows the game 1b with the one point core.  The core, the nucleolus and the
competitive equilibrium all coincide, but the value indicated by V is out of the core.
The figure for the third game is not drawn, but we note that the game has an empty core,
no competitive equilibrium point  and that the value solution is the point (108, 133, 158) and
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Table 1a illustrates the selections from the Yale Games.  We observe that the percentage
of imputations selected within the core varies from a low of 86% to a high of 100%.  This
contrasts with Table 1b for the second game, where the percentage selected in the core
varies from a low of 5% to a high of 28.5%.
Points in the Core
Yale
1980 1981 1983 1984 1985 1988 1989 1991S 1991F Total
(100, 150, 150) 29 20 15 7 19 21 12 15 10 148
(67.5, 133.7, 200) 5 3 7 0 2 2 4 3 7 33
(100, 133, 167) 5 1 2 0 6 4 4 8 36
(100, 125, 175) 2 0 1 2 3 3 1 1 0 13
Other core points 9 9 2 8 14 14 10 10 7 83
TOTAL 50 33 27 17 44 46 31 33 32 313
Points Not in Core
(133.3, 133.3, 133.3) 6 4 3 2 3 3 2 0 1 24
Other not in core 2 4 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 6
TOTAL 8 5 4 2 3 4 3 0 1 30
% in core 86% 87% 87% 89% 94% 92% 91% 100% 97% 91%
% not in core 14% 13% 13% 11% 6% 8% 9% 0% 3% 9%
No reply 0 2 1 2 0 0 1 9 3 18
Inefficient/other 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 5
Illogical 2 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 6
TOTAL 3 3 2 5 0 0 3 10 3 29
POPULATION 61 41 33 24 47 50 37 43 36 372
TABLE 1a
Points in the Core
Yale
1980 1981 1983 1984 1985 1988 1989 1991S 1991F Total
(0, 0, 400) 7 0 3 4 3 2 3 6 4 32
(e, e, 400-2e) e < 1 8 2 4 0 5 3 7 5 4 38
TOTAL 15 2 7 4 8 5 10 11 8 70
Points Not in Core
(100, 100, 200) 28 28 16 10 25 24 19 19 18 187
(133.3, 133.3, 133.3) 5 4 3 2 2 4 1 1 0 22
(75, 75, 250) 2 0 0 1 2 1 0 1 0 7
(50, 50, 300) 0 2 3 1 2 5 1 1 2 17
Other core points 3 4 3 3 1 6 4 4 1 29
TOTAL 38 38 25 17 32 40 25 26 21 262
% in core 28% 5% 22% 19% 20% 11% 29% 30% 28% 21%
% not in core 72% 95% 78% 81% 80% 89% 71% 70% 72% 79%
No reply 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 5 14
Inefficient/other 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 5
Illogical 2 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 6
TOTAL 3 1 1 3 0 0 2 10 5 25
POPULATION 56 41 33 24 40 45 37 47 34 357
TABLE 1b
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We may note that the size of the core in Game 1a relative to the whole simplex is 3/16
= .1875.  If choice were random this is the percentage of choices we would expect in the
core of game 1a.  We would expect essentially no points in the core for game 1b under
random choice.
The details for the Australian, Indian and other data are given in Appendix 1.  Here a
summary is given of the distinctions between the selections in Games 1a and 1b indicating
the differences in frequencies of selections of points in the core and the frequencies of the
selection of the symmetric point and the top two most frequently selected imputations.  The
Australian games with the same economics briefings as the Yale, India and other games are
included as AusA and the others as AusB. 
% in Core % at Even #1 #2
1a 1b 1a 1b 1a 1b 1a 1b
Agg 90 27.4 7.6 16.3 29.9 56.3 8 27.4
Yale 91 21 7 6.6 43 56.3 10.7 21
AusA 93 47 5.6 52.9 0 0 11.1 45
AusB 77 37 18 60 9.6 0 9.4 37
India 94 54 4 0 30.1 25.5 4.9 54
Other 76 28.1 18 26.7 39.3 42.3 4.3 28.1
TABLE 2
As might be expected the most frequently selected imputations differed in the two
games.  The top two choices for game 1a were (100,150,150) 29.9%, then (100,133,167)
with 8%.
The top choices for game 1b (100,100,200) with 56.3%, then (0,0,400) with 27.4%.  The
top choice for 1a was a point in the “equal division core” proposed by Selten (1972).  The
top choice for game 1b preserved the symmetry of the first two player and could be
interpreted naturally in terms of a syndicate approach where the first two players form a
syndicate thus converting the game into a symmetric two person game where the first two
players split the proceeds from the fair division of the “two person” game.  For none of the
three games played nine times at Yale was the value  selected more than 3% of the time.
When the nucleolus, core and competitive equilibrium all coincided they were selected 27.4
% of the time with the other selections indicating a dissatisfaction with the inequity of this
outcome.  A comparison of top selections is given in Table 5 where the responses of
students are contrasted with those of game theorists.
Would or Should?
At one session in Australia the respondents were asked not merely to be the judge for game
1a, but to also answer what they thought would happen if the game were actually played.
There were 28 respondents and the differences between “should” and “would” were of note
as is shown in Table 3.  We observe that (at least among the Australians) when confronted
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with the “should, would” distinction, the normative prescription was overwhelmingly for
equity, whereas the expected behavior was for less symmetry.  The two predominant choices
for expected behavior were the nucleolus followed by collaboration only among the top two
players.
Outcome Should # Should % Would #  Would %
(133,133,133) 21 75 3 10.7
(67,133,200) 1 3.5 2 7.1
(83,133,183) 2 7.1 0 0
(50,125,225) 1 3.5 5 17.9
other in core 3 10.6 7 25
(-,3/2,3/2) 0 0 4 14.3
no reply/error 0 0 7 25
TABLE 3
The Game Without the Core
Game #6 had no core.  Time constraints in lecturing were such that outside of Yale I did not
have the opportunity to use game 6 and to compare it with the two games with cores. How-
ever nine games at Yale provided the basis for the comparison.  Table 4 presents the
statistics.  We observe that 24% of the time the even split was selected, followed by a split
of (50,175,175) for 21.2% of the selections, then (125,125,150) for approximately 16%.  In
all of the games the even split of (133,133,133) is the only solution which does not change
position.  The core goes from a large area to a point and then disappears; while the value and
nucleolus move with the characteristic function’s values.
Yale
1980 1981 1983 1984 1985 1988 1989 1991S 1991F Total Percentages
(133,133,133) 14 6 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 32 24.24%
(125,125,150) 5 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 21 15.91%
(120,133,147) 0 5 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 9 6.82%
(100,133,167) 1 2 0 2 0 1 1 1 0 8 6.06%
100,125,175) 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 7 5.30%
(89,133,178) 1 1 1 1 1 4 1 0 2 12 9.09%
(75,175,150) 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 3 0 5 3.79%
(67,133,200) 3 0 1 0 1 1 1 3 0 10 7.58%
(50,175,175) 2 4 1 0 4 10 3 3 1 28 21.21%
Others 4 4 15 9 5 15 10 7 10 9 37.44%
TOTAL 31 25 24 18 17 36 21 22 17 211
No reply 4 0 0 0 4 1 2 6 0 17
Infeasible 4 1 2 0 1 1 0 0 1 10
TOTAL 8 1 2 0 5 2 2 6 1 27
POPULATION 39 26 26 18 22 38 23 28 18 238
TABLE 4.  A Game Without a Core
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A Game with a Dummy Player
By accident at the University of West Ontario there was an error in the presentation of game
1b.  Instead of the correct characteristic function, player 1 was converted into a dummy, i.e.
player 1 made no marginal contribution to productivity.  The characteristic function
presented was:
Game 1b
v(A) = v(B) = v(C) =0
v(AB) =0, v(AC) = 0, v(BC) = 400
v(ABC) =400. 
Table 5 shows that the dummy is treated as a dummy, except for one small “tip” or
charitable contribution. (15 respondents and 2 with no reply excluded from calculation) 
Imputation Percentage
(0, 200, 200) 73.3
(0, 400–x, x) 20
(1, 199.5, 199.5) 6.7
TABLE 5
The Game with Game Theorists
In May 1983 at a conference on game theory I elicited responses from 28 professional game
theorists as to how they felt games 1a and 1b should be settled.  The responses are shown
in Table 6.  We note that one responded that he did not believe in cooperative solutions, but
would accept the core for game 1a, but did not respond to game 1b.  One other offered two
solutions for each game and was counted twice.  In Table 6 the first two outcomes are the
values for games 1a and 1b; the next two are the nucleolus for games 1a and 1b.  We see that
there is a considerable selection of the Shapley value as the norm whereas the unsophisticate
players were not aware of the value or the reasoning behind it.
OUTCOME G.T. 1a G.T. 1b Others 1a Others 1b
(67.3,133,3,183.3) 53.6 0 3< 3<
(66.6,66.6,266.6) 0 39.3 3< 3<
(50,125,225) 3.6 0 3< 3<
(0,0,400) 0 21.4 0 27.4
(100,100,200) 14.3 14.3 3< 56.3
(100,133,167) 0 0 3< 8
(133.3,133.3,133.3) 3.6 7.1 24 29.9
TABLE 6
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The Game with Managers and Renormalization
In the early 1980s games 1a and 1b were used three times with managers of Shell Petroleum.
The first two game sessions were precisely as those run at Yale, but the third session
employed a different normalization of the characteristic functions.  Instead of having the
coalition v(123) =400 it was set to 700.  The characteristic functions used were:
Game 1a
v(A) = v(B) = v(C) =100
v(AB) =300, v(AC) = 400, v(BC) = 500
v(ABC) =700. 
Game 1b
v(A) = v(B) = v(C) =100
v(AB) =200, v(AC) =200, v(BC) = 600
v(ABC) =700. 
Theoretically as all that has happened is that each player is rewarded an extra 100.   The
incremental gain has not been changed.  However the perception of asymmetry in the games
has been modified.  In Table 7 below the imputations for the last session were constructed
from the original data by removing 100 from the amount awarded to each.  Similarly for
Table 8 the imputations in the renormalized games have been reconstructed.
1a Session 1 Session 2 Renormalized
(100,150,150) 3 6 6
(100,.133,167) 2 4 0
Other in core 10 7 5
(133.3,133.3,133.3) 0 1 0
not in core 1 0 7
TABLE 7
1b Session 1 Session 2 Renormalized
(100,100,200) 5 9 5
(50,50,300) 1 2 2
(133.3,133.3,133.3) 1 2 0
Other 2 4 6
(0,0,400) and e 1 1 5
TABLE 8
The influence of the renormalization appears to have made (0,0,400), the core for game
1b appear to be less unfair and nonsymmetric.  In game 1a the number of points out of the
core was notably higher, however as the core is now much smaller relative to the
unnormalized simplex it may be more difficult to note intuitively that a point is in the core.
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For the first two sessions 94% of the imputations selected were in the core, the average for
the Yale games was 91%.
Discussion
The context of the running of these informal experiments was a series of classes and lectures
in game theory.  There were some differences in briefing which are noted.  All but four of
the games were run with an economic productivity scenario.  (See Appendix 2 for the actual
briefing.)  Four of the games in Australia were run with a purely abstract presentation of the
characteristic function with no productivity story.  One game in Australia (noted separately)
asked the participants both a “should” and “would” question, i.e., “How do you think the
gain should be spit and how to you thing it would be split if the individuals settled among
themselves rather than asked for a judgement?”
There were some differences in the make up of the respondents.  Those at Yale, in India
and in Hong Kong were almost all economics or business students, in Australia there were
social science faculty and students and in one instance mathematicians without game theory
training.
There is evidence that the story and the briefing can have considerable influence on the
play.  Professor John Kennedy of Princeton used to half-jokingly remark “you tell me what
results you want and give me control of the briefing and I will get you the results.”  A Ph.D
thesis by R. I. Simon (1967) took a two person zero sum game and wrote three scenarios for
it.  He obtained statistically significant different results for the same game with different
scenarios.
Several respondents in Hong Kong and two elsewhere, instead of providing an impu-
tation dividing the 400 into three, divided it into four, giving the judge his cut of the
division.
Many of the respondents provided justification or explanation of their selections.  I have
not made a formal analysis of the written material, although it is available.  In essence, the
written responses varied encompassing considerations of fairness, equity, symmetry, produc-
tivity, efficiency and coalitional power.  But these desiderata may clash with each other.  In
particular this was illustrated in game 1b where the nonsymmetry of the core drove many
respondents to selecting points out of the core.  When the core was fat, as in game 1a, almost
all of the respondents chose points in the core.  The reason for the high percentage of selec-
tion of the point (100,150,150) was the it is the point in the core of game 1a which while
still in the core gets as close as possible to the even split solution.
The accidental use of a characteristic function with player 1 as a dummy instead of as
in game 1b gave support to the standard “dummy axiom” in game theory that a dummy
should receive no gain.  Even here however one respondent left a little for the dummy.
The corporate respondents were much like the economics students, except when the
game was renormalized.
There was a wide discrepancy between the professional game theorists and the other
respondents.  But the game theorists were not unanimous on normative choices.  One was
antipathetic to cooperative game theory.  However the predominant view was that the
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Shapley value provided the best a priori single point normative solution, with the next most
favored imputation in Game 1a being (100,100,200), the most symmetric point in the equal
treatment core.  It is my belief that it is extremely difficult to perform highly controlled
experiments involving socio-economic behavior with humans except in highly context
relevant situations.  The respondent’s mind is not a tabula rasa and an apparently controlled
sterile environment in the laboratory may magnify the lack of control over the influence of
the individual’s history.
It is my belief that an alternative or supplementary approach to the laboratory is to
gather large samples from teaching uses and from ongoing activities.  Experimental subjects
are expensive, however cheap large, less controlled samples may provide useful insight.
There is still much to be learned from activities such as chess or casino gambling.  If the
boards at all chess clubs were sensitized to gather and automatically data process the games
played and some of games at Las Vegas and other casinos were redesigned for automated
data bank construction large samples could be gathered at near to zero marginal cost.
If games were more utilized in educational procedures it would be feasible to automate
the type of material discussed here so that the large number of observations would serve as
a source of insight into both normative and actual competitive choice behavior.  The games
discussed here were relatively cheap to run in both time and money and were of educational
use.  There are undoubtedly some games in which the paying of the players is important.
There are others in which it is probably not so.  
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Games 1a and 1b Australia
Australia (math) Economics Briefing Total
1 2 3 4 5 6
Points in the Core
(100,150,150) 6 0 2 0 0 0 8
(67.3,133.7,200) 5 3 7 0 2 2 19
(100,133,167) 5 1 2 0 6 6 20
(100,125,175) 2 0 1 2 3 3 11
Other core points 9 9 2 8 14 14 56
TOTAL 27 13 14 10 25 25 114
Points Not in Core
(133.3,133.3,133.3) 6 4 3 2 3 3 21
Other not in core 2 1 1 0 0 1 5
TOTAL 8 5 4 2 3 4 26
% in core 77% 72% 78% 83% 89% 86% 81%
% not in core 23% 28% 22% 17% 11% 14% 19%
No reply 0 2 1 2 0 0 5
Inefficient/other 1 1 0 2 0 0 4
Illogical 2 0 1 1 0 0 4
TOTAL 3 3 2 5 0 0 13
POPULATION 38 21 20 17 28 29 153
GAME 1a
Australia (math) Economics Briefing Total
1 2 3 4 5 6
Points in Core
(0,0,400) 6 0 2 0 0 0 8
(e,e,400-2e) e<1 2 1 2 0 6 2 13
TOTAL 8 1 4 0 6 2 21
Points Not in Core
(100,100,200) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(133.3,133.3,133.3) 8 3 7 3 5 4 30
(75,75,250) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(50,50,300) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other core points 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
TOTAL 9 3 7 3 5 4 31
% in core 47% 25% 36% 0% 55% 33% 40%
% not in core 53% 75% 64% 100% 45% 67% 60%
No reply 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Inefficient/other 1 1 0 2 0 0 4
Illogical 2 0 1 1 0 0 4
TOTAL 3 1 1 3 0 0 8
POPULATION 20 5 12 6 11 6 60
GAME 1b
15
Games 1a and 1b India
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total
Points in the Core
(100,150,150) 4 5 2 7 8 5 0 31 17.51%
(67.3,133.7,200) 1 7 0 4 3 1 1 17 9.60%
(100,133,167) 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 5 2.82%
(100,125,175) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00%
Other core points 2 15 5 21 35 26 9 113 63.84%
TOTAL 7 27 8 36 46 32 10 166 93.79%
Points Not in Core
(133.3,133.3,133.3) 1 0 1 1 1 3 0 7 3.95%
Other not in core 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 4 2.26%
TOTAL 1 1 1 2 2 4 0 11
% in core 88% 96% 89% 95% 96% 89% 100% 94%
% not in core 13% 4% 11% 5% 4% 11% 0% 6%
No reply 11 22 0 2 11 5 2 53
Inefficient/other 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2
Illogical 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2
TOTAL 11 22 1 5 11 5 2 57
POPULATION 19 50 10 43 59 41 12 234
GAME 1a
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total
Points in Core
(0,0,400) 0 0 0 0 23 5 2 30 54.55%
(e,e,400-2e) e<1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00%
TOTAL 0 0 0 0 23 5 2 30 54.55%
Points Not in Core
(100,100,200) 0 0 0 0 8 2 4 14 25.45%
(133.3,133.3,133.3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00%
(75,75,250) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00%
(50,50,300) 0 0 0 0 5 0 1 6 10.91%
Other core points 0 0 0 0 9 4 2 15 27.27%
TOTAL 0 0 0 0 14 4 7 25 45.45%
% in core 0% 0% 0% 0% 62% 56% 22% 55%
% not in core 0% 0% 0% 0% 38% 44% 78% 45%
No reply 0 0 0 0 14 30 3 47
Inefficient/other 0 0 0 0 8 2 0 10
Illogical 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 0 0 0 0 22 32 3 57




Bdlr SF1 g1 g2 HK W Ont Shell1 Shell2 Shell3
Points in the Core
(100,150,150) 7 3 8 3 12 4 3 6 6
(67.3,133.7,200) 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
(100,133,167) 1 0 0 1 2 0 2 4 0
(100,125,175) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Other core points 2 6 4 5 4 7 10 7 5
TOTAL 10 10 12 9 19 11 16 17 11
Points Not in Core
(133.3,133.3,133.3) 6 1 6 1 3 1 0 1 0
Other not in core 3 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 7
TOTAL 9 1 6 1 5 1 1 1 7
% in core 53% 91% 67% 90% 79% 92% 94% 94% 61%
% not in core 47% 9% 33% 10% 21% 8% 6% 6% 39%
No reply 0 1 10 1 9 9 1 0 0
Inefficient/other 1 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 0
Illogical 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0
TOTAL 1 2 10 3 12 12 1 0 0
POPULATION 20 13 28 13 36 24 18 18 18
GAME 1a
Bdlr SF1 g1 g2 HK W Ont Shell1 Shell2 Shell3
Points in Core
(0,0,400) 6 2 2 2 1 1 1 4
(e,e,400-2e) e<1 2 1 2 1 1 0 0 1
TOTAL 8 3 4 3 2 error 1 1 5
Points Not in Core
(100,100,200) 0 6 8 6 10 5 9 5
(133.3,133.3,133.3) 8 0 4 0 1 1 2 0
(75,75,250) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(50,50,300) 0 1 0 1 1 1 2 2
Other core points 1 1 0 1 2 2 4 6
TOTAL 9 8 12 8 14 9 17 13
% in core 47% 27% 25% 275 13%
% not in core 53% 73% 75% 73% 88%
No reply 3 2 12 2 20 8 0 0
Inefficient/other 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Illogical 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 6 2 12 2 20 8 0 0





  a. Three individuals can, by cooperation on a job earn $400 altogether; if A and B
cooperate they earn $100, if A and C cooperate they earn $200, if B and C cooperate
they earn $300.  The man left out earns nothing.  This information can be summarized
as follows:
V(A) = V(B) = V(C) = 0
V(AB) = 100, V(AC) = 200, V(BC) = 300
V(ABC) = 400
You are the judge, the three tell you that they have decided to work together to earn
$400, but they cannot decide how to split the income.  Write down three a1, a2, a3 such
that:
a1 + a2 + a3 = 400
This is your split of the income, give your reasons for choosing it.
  b. Suppose that instead of the above productivity C was vital to the job and only one of A
or B were really needed.  The earnings are summarized as follows:
V(A) = V(B) = V(C) = 0
V(AB) = 0, V(AC) = 400, V(BC) = 400
V(ABC) = 400
State how you would split the $400 here and give you reasons.
GAME 6
You originally acted as judge in the division of proceeds between 3 individuals with
different productivity who had agreed to cooperate.  You were asked to act as judge
once more in a somewhat different case.  The values of the coalitions are given below:
V(A) = V(B) = V(C) = 0
V(AB) = 250, V(AC) = 300, V(BC) = 350
V(ABC) = 400
